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Introduction 
Stop and search without suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, having never come before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) prior to 2010, has been the subject of two cases in 
two years: Gillan v United Kingdom and Colon v Netherlands.1   
Gillan concerned suspicionless stop and search under the Terrorism Act 2000 s.44 whereby 
the police could stop and search any person without suspicion in an authorised area for 
articles that could be used in connection with terrorism.  Gillan had been stopped and 
searched under section 44 on his way to a demonstration outside an arms fair.  The second 
applicant, a journalist, was stopped on her way to film the demonstration.  The Divisional 
Court held that the authorisation permitting stops and searches in that area was not ultra vires 
and that neither the authorisation nor the exercise of the power infringed their right to liberty 
under the ECHR, Article 5, their right to a private life under Article 8, or their right to 
freedom of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11.2  That decision was upheld by 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.3  The ECtHR ruled only on the Article 8 issue, 
upholding the applicants’ complaint that the exercise of section 44 infringed their right to 
                                                            
1Gillan v United Kingdom  (2010) 50 EHRR 45; Colon v Netherlands (2012) 55 EHRR SE5. 
2 R (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2003] EWHC 2545 
(Admin).  
3 R (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2004] EWCA Civ 
1067; [2005] QB 388; [2006] UKHL 12; [2006] 2 A.C. 307. 
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respect for their private lives under the ECHR, Article 8 and that it was unjustifiable under 
Article 8(2) as section 44 was not prescribed by law.   
Colon concerned the use of “preventive searches” in the Netherlands, instigated following a 
rise in violent crime, which permitted the police to stop and search without suspicion any 
person in a pre-designated “security risk area” for weapons.4  Colon had been stopped in a 
designated area, refused to submit to the search and was arrested.  At first instance he was 
found guilty of failing to obey a lawful order, under the Criminal Code, art.184, and fined 
€150.  He successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal but the decision was quashed 
following an appeal by the Advocate General to the Supreme Court and the case was remitted 
to the Court of Appeal for re-hearing.  Colon was found guilty but not fined.  Before the 
ECtHR he argued, inter alia, that his Article 8 rights had been infringed by the use of 
“preventive searches”.  The ECtHR unanimously dismissed the complaints, holding that the 
designation of areas as security risk areas under the Municipalities Act, s.151b, and the 
subsequent suspicionless stop and search under the Arms and Ammunitions, s.52(3) was 
prescribed by law and that the interference with Article 8 was proportionate and justifiable 
under Article 8(2) as pursuing the aims of public safety and the prevention of crime or 
disorder.  The ruling in Colon is relevant to UK domestic law for two reasons.  First, there are 
interesting comparisons with the contrary ruling in Gillan.5  Second, Colon raises questions 
regarding the legality of suspicionless stop and search under the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994, s.60. 
 
Preventive searches 
                                                            
4 See further: Joanne van der Leun & Maartje van der Woude, “Ethnic profiling in the Netherlands? A 
reflection on expanding preventive powers, ethnic profiling and a changing social and political 
context” (2011) 21(4) Policing & Society 444. 
5 Gillan v United Kingdom  (2010) 50 EHRR 45. 
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Colon concerned preventive searches in Amsterdam whereby the Burgomaster, equivalent to 
a Mayor, could designate an area as a “security risk area” “in the event of a public order 
disturbance caused by the presence of weapons, or if there is a serious fear of such a 
disturbance occurring”. 6   Prior violent weapons incidents provided sufficient cause to 
designate an area.  The public prosecutor could then, for a selected twelve hour period, 
empower the police to stop and search any persons or vehicles in the area, without suspicion, 
for offensive weapons.  The police could search clothing, handbags, backpacks and similar 
pieces of luggage.  Failure to submit to a stop and search constituted a criminal offence 
punishable by up to three months imprisonment or a fine.7  The security risk areas were first 
designated in November 2002 for six months.  The area in question in Colon was subject to 
repeated designation up to 2009.    
This formula of prior authorisation followed by the deployment of suspicionless stop and 
search powers will be familiar to many as mirroring the model used in the Terrorism Act 
2000 s.44.8  Section 44 permitted Assistant Chief Constables or Chief Constables to authorise 
the use of the power if they considered it “expedient” for the prevention of acts of terrorism.  
Thereafter, a uniformed officer could stop and search any person or vehicle within the 
authorised area, without suspicion, for “articles that could be used in connection with 
terrorism”.  Failure to submit to a stop constituted a criminal offence, punishable by up to six 
months’ imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.  Each 
authorisation could extend up to the force area and last for up to twenty-eight days.  In 
                                                            
6 Municipalities Act, s.155. 
7 Netherlands Criminal Code, art.184. 
8 For commentary on the current power under the Terrorism Act 2000, s.47A, which replaced section 
44, and also on Gillan see: Ed Cape “The counter-terrorism provisions of the Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012: preventing misuse or a case of smoke and mirrors?” (2013) 5 CrimLR 385. 
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practice the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), who were the subject of Gillan, had a 
rolling, force-wide authorisation in place for over eight years, between 2001 and 2009.9    
Prescribed by law 
What is interesting from a UK perspective is why preventive searches were held to be 
prescribed by law in Colon when s.44 was held not be in Gillan.  There appear to be two 
major reasons.  First, the ECtHR emphasised that there was a viable system of review in 
Colon.10  The Burgomaster had to consult with the head of the regional police and the public 
prosecutor before designating a security risk area.  At first blush this appears comparable to 
confirmation of s.44 authorisations by the Secretary of State, required within 48 hours or the 
authorisation by the Chief Constable would lapse.11  However, there was greater democratic 
accountability in Colon as any member of the Local Council could question the Burgomaster 
regarding the order.  The ECtHR also emphasised that under the Municipalities Act, s.151b, 
the Local Council had to pass a municipal bye-law which empowered the Burgomaster to 
designate security risk areas, thereby permitting the Council greater democratic control over 
the process.12  In the UK, the Terrorism Act 2000 was, of course, also subject to democratic 
control, even if the debate on s.44 was limited.  The ECtHR may, therefore, have been 
emphasising the local democratic oversight and also the relative ease with which the bye-law 
could be amended or repealed in comparison with national law.  Finally, the security risk area 
designations were public and the Council and public prosecutor had to be informed when a 
designation was issued.  This is crucial in enabling such oversight bodies as exist to conduct 
effective review and contrasts starkly with s.44 authorisations which were not made public.  
                                                            
9 Metropolitan Police Service Section 44 Authorisation Data (Metropolitan Police Service, 2010). 
10 Colon (2012) 55 EHRR SE5 [76]. 
11 Terrorism Act 2000, s.46(4). 
12 Colon (2012) 55 EHRR SE5 [67]. 
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The police were not even obliged to inform the relevant Police Authority when an 
authorisation was in force.13 
Second, and arguably more importantly, was the operational practice.  The Netherlands were 
able to rely on two independent reports which asserted the effectiveness of preventive 
searches and recommended their continued deployment.14  The reports indicated that the use 
of weapons had decreased in the designated areas while increasing in the non-designated 
areas.  By contrast, the ECtHR in Gillan noted that there were no terrorism related arrests 
from the s.44 stops.15  In fact, over the course of the period that s. 44 was in force, there were 
332 terrorism related arrests made from 574,048 Home Office stops, but given this equates to 
a hit-rate of 0.05% it is something of a moot point.16  Equally damaging in Gillan was 
statistical evidence of disproportionality in relation to ethnic minority groups.17 
This contrasting practice perhaps explains why in Colon the ECtHR criticised aspects of s.44 
but failed to comment on similar features evident in preventive searches.18  For example, the 
ECtHR highlighted the lack of effective judicial review in Gillan, largely enabled by the 
extremely broad discretion of the authorising officer, but failed to draw any comparisons 
with, or even discuss, the significant, albeit slightly more limited, discretion of the 
Burgomaster.  Similarly, the ECtHR noted that “most strikingly” officers had discretion as to 
who to select to stop for a s.44 stop. 19   The exact same discretion applies to officers 
conducting preventive searching, raising questions regarding the potential for the arbitrary 
                                                            
13 Genevieve Lennon “Policing terrorist risk: stop and search under the Terrorism Act 2000, Section 
44” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds, July 2011). 
14 COT Institute for Safety and Crisis Management Evaluatie Preventief Fouilleren in Amsterdam: 
opbrengsten, wapenincidenten en hot spots (COT: the Hague, 2007); COT Institute for Safety and 
Crisis Management Evaluatie Preventief Fouilleren in Amsterdam: de stand van zaken (COT: the 
Hague, 2006). 
15 Gillan v United Kingdom  (2010) 50 EHRR 45 [84]. 
16 Home Office, Statistics on race and the criminal justice system, (Home Office, 2002-2004, 2006); 
Ministry of Justice, Statistics on race and the criminal justice system (Ministry of Justice, 2007-2011). 
17 Gillan v United Kingdom  (2010) 50 EHRR 45 [85]. 
18 Colon (2012) 55 EHRR SE5 [73]. 
19 Colon (2012) 55 EHRR SE5 [73]. 
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exercise of power, but this was, again, not even mentioned.   The fact that the Secretary of 
State failed to reject or modify any s.44 authorisations was noted by the ECtHR in Gillan but 
there is no mention of whether the public prosecutor questioned any of the designations in 
Colon nor whether any member of the Local Council had in fact queried the Burgomaster.20    
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.60 
Reading Colon, prompts comparison with s.44 precisely because of the Gillan case, but 
arguably, the preventive searches in issue in Colon more closely resemble suspicionless stop 
and search under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.60.  Section 60 was 
originally conceived to deal with football related violence but has been increasingly used to 
tackle knife crime, for example as part of the MPS’ Operations Blunt I and II.21  The power 
has been extensively used by a small number of forces, notably the MPS (90,809 persons 
stopped in 2009/10), Merseyside (15,778), Lancashire (3,629) and Greater Manchester 
(2,458).22  Combined, these forces accounted for 95% of the total number of s.60 stops in 
2009/10.   
Section 60 follows a similar formula to preventive searches and s.44, enabling suspicionless 
stop and search in areas which have been authorised in advance.  Inspectors or officers of 
higher ranks may give an authorisation under s.60 if they reasonably believe that serious 
violence will take place and s.60 is expedient to prevent it; that serious violence has occurred 
and the use of s.60 is expedient to find the dangerous instruments or offensive weapons used 
in the incident; or that dangerous instruments or offensive weapons are being carried.23  Once 
authorised, officers may stop and search any person or vehicle without reasonable suspicion 
                                                            
20 Gillan v United Kingdom  (2010) 50 EHRR 45 [80]. 
21 Leonard Jason-Lloyd “Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: its current 
provisions and future changes” (1998) 162 Justice of the Peace 837; House of Commons, Home 
Affairs Committee, Knife crime: session 2008-09 (The Stationery Office, 2009) HC Paper No.112 
(Session 2008-09). 
22 Ministry of Justice, Statistics on race and the criminal justice system (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
23 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, s.60(1). 
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for weapons or similar articles.  The power is limited to 24 hours, extendable by a further 24 
hours, however, it has been used on an extended basis by some forces, such as the MPS in Blunt II.24    
In light of Colon, the question arises whether s.60 is Convention compliant?  The discretion 
of officers exercising the power is the same as in Colon with a virtually identical objective.  
The authorising officer’s discretion is broader as s.60 can be authorised simply because 
weapons are being carried as opposed to be being carried and likely to cause serious public 
disorder as required for preventive searches.  It is also broader as there is no requirement of 
external consultation nor any opportunity, apart from judicial review, to question the 
authorisation.  While the public prosecutor’s role cannot be replicated, the recent move to 
locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) suggests a route of democratic 
accountability that could mirror the role of the Local Council as emphasised by the ECtHR in 
Colon.  While the police retain operational independence, the PCCs can require Chief 
Constables attend before the Police and Crime Panel to answer questions or to submit a report 
on the exercise of their functions which is comparable to the ability of the Local Council in 
Colon to question the Burgomaster regarding the designation order. 25   The question of 
effectiveness, and proof thereof, is contested and the outcome of an up-to-date independent 
study or studies could be a determining factor.  The High Court recently held s.60 to be 
Convention compliant.  However, the Court refused to allow a late submission of evidence on 
the use of s.60 and, it is submitted, placed insufficient weight on the lack of effective 
methods of review.26       
Conclusion 
                                                            
24 See further House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Knife crime: session 2008-09. 
25 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, s.29. 




Colon serves to quiet the fears of some who suggested that Gillan heralded the death of 
public order policing in general and stop and search in particular.27  It also serves to reinforce 
the impression that the ECtHR has, since Gillan, changed tack in relation to policing and is 
placing public policing under less scrutiny, as also suggested by the approach in Austin.28  
The reliance on empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the preventive searches underlines 
the importance of evidence based policing and independent scrutiny.  While one can only 
speculate, it seems unlikely that the same weight would have been placed on the evaluation of 
preventive searches if they had been conducted in-house.   
                                                            
27 Richard Buxton “Terrorism and the European Convention” (2010) 7 CrimLR 542. 
28 Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14; Genevieve Lennon “The purpose of the right to 
liberty under the ECHR, Article 5” (2012) 3 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues.  
